In this paper we are interested in the veri cation of safety properties of parameterized networks. A network is de ned as a parallel composition of an arbitrary but nite number of identical sequential processes, where we consider parallel composition by interleaving and synchronization by shared variables. Using abstraction techniques, a process, called an abstract network, encoding the behavior of the entire network is constructed. The property is then checked on this process. Our veri cation method has the following advantages: the construction of the abstract network is fully automatic; the obtained process is generally a simple process on which the property can be easily veri ed. Of course, if the property cannot be veri ed on the abstract network, another more precise abstraction has to be computed. The construction requires to discharge a set of rst order veri cation conditions (VCs). The PVS theorem prover is used to discharge the generated VCs. This allows us to consider processes with arbitrary data types. The e ectiveness of our veri cation method is illustrated on two examples including a parameterized version of the Fischer's protocol.
Introduction
Parameterized networks of processes are an interesting class of in nite state systems where both the control part and the data part can be in nite. Up to now, methods have been proposed to solve this problem only in the case where either the control part or the data part is nite.
On one hand, several approaches can lead with the veri cation of a in nite state process. In GS97], we present an algorithm for the automatic construction of an abstract state graph. It allows to construct this graph for a xed number of parallel components by discharging a set of rst order formulas called veri cation conditions (VCs) . Each abstract state is a valuation of a set of predicates ' 1 ; :::; '`de ning the abstract state space and a valuation of the concrete global control con guration.
On the other hand, several attempts KM89,WL89,HLR92] were made to use an induction principle in order to verify systems with an in nite control part. In CGJ95], this technique is applied to process networks generated by a regular grammar. They propose an extrapolation operator, based on the construction of the syntactic monoid Eil74], to produce a suitable invariant. In LHR97,Les97], we state this problem as the resolution of a least or greatest xpoint equation. We propose further more some extrapolation techniques to compute an approximation of these xpoints.
Some research groups have explored the case where the structure of the network can be extrapolated. In SG87, MP95] , they propose to encode a network of nite state processes by a linear system of equations constructed in the following way. They introduce for each state q of a single process an integer variable X q counting the number of processes in this state. Thus if a single process moves from state q to state q 0 , variables X q and X q 0 are respectively increased and decreased.
In this paper we propose to extend the previous methods SG87,MP95] to the problem of the veri cation of safety properties of parameterized networks of in nite state processes, in using techniques developed in GS97]. We consider parallel composition by interleaving and synchronization by shared variables. We propose to apply successively two di erent abstraction techniques in order to encode the behavior of the parallel composition of an arbitrary number of identical sequential processes. First, we construct an abstraction for a single process, and second we construct an abstract network using the obtained abstract process. The constructed abstract network is a process with a nite set of transitions and a nite set of global control con gurations. It has as variables the global variables of the concrete network, and a set of integers variables. These variables are added to count the number of processes of the concrete network verifying some predicates. In this abstract network only linear operations are performed on these integer variables. Thus if all the global variables of the concrete network are linear variables, we obtain a linear system on which the property we want to verify can be easily checked using classical veri cation methods such as deductive methods as in Sa 97], or using combination of abstraction techniques and deductive methods as in GS97] , or using symbolic model checking using polyhedra as in HPR94]. The advantage of our method is that the abstract network can be constructed fully automatically.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives some preliminary denition to de ne our computational model that is transition systems. Section 3 describes the abstraction techniques used to abstract one process, and then section 4 our abstraction algorithm to abstract a network. We nally illustrate the method on two examples in section 5.
2
As computational model for processes we use transition systems, labeled by guarded commands. G 1 is the set of global variables depending on some local variables. These variables will be abstracted in the construction of the abstract network.
G 2 = G ?G 1 , that is the set of global variables which do not depend on local variables. Let be a set of predicates used in the process S i (e.g., the set of literals appearing in the guards of the process transitions).
Let us partition on 3 sets of predicates 1 , 2 and 3 , depending on the previous partition of G.
1 is the set of predicates depending only on local variables. They will be used to de ne the abstract processS i (and will be ignored in the abstract network) 2 is the set of all predicates depending on global variables of G 1 . They will be used to de ne the abstract network. Indeed, since they depend on local variables (which are abstracted), their values will be unknown in the 4 abstract network.
3 is the set of all predicates depending only on global variables of G 2 . There are the only predicates which will appear in the abstract network. Thus, we de neS i as the abstraction of S i using the predicates of 1 . De Let us denote by the set of valuation on 2 .
We propose then to construct an abstraction of the network usingS i and . The idea is to construct a process encoding the behavior of the network, where only global variables of G 2 appear: we propose to associate to each abstract state l i , a set of new variables (X j i ), which counts the number of processes which are in the ith abstract state, and which satisfy a predicates valuation j 2 . (l i 0 ))) Of course, only some of these guards are satis able. 5
Each assignment v k := e k is either abstracted if (v k = e k ) 2 2 , or is maintained (in this case, only non abstract global variables appear in this assignment, that is (v k = e k ) 2 3 ). 
Examples
This section presents two examples of mutual exclusion. Transition systems describing a process are shown respectively g. 1 and 5. The tool IC described in Sa 97] computes an abstraction of these two processes by spliting each state depending on the predicates which appear in guards or assignments. The tool described in LS97] computes the abstract network.
The mux ast system
Consider the following example taken from MP95], and implementing a mutual exclusion algorithm for n processes. Each process S i has a local variable T i and can access to the shared variable y (see g. 1). As soon as a process attempts to enter its critical section, the predicate y 0 is true.
The abstract processS i is obtained using the predicates appearing in the guards and depending on the variable T i , that is the predicates: 1 = f(T i < 2). Since y does not depend on local variables, the set 2 is empty and the global variable y is not abstracted (that is G 1 = ; and G 2 = G = fyg). Variable T i has been abstracted, it is showed on transitions only for convenience. On each state, a predicate on T i must be satis ed. In the abstract process, dashed transitions are undeterministic. The predicate associated with the target state allows us to compute a precondition on y: to reach predicates T i = 0, T i > 0 and T i < 0 with the assignment T i := y ? 1, y must satisfy respectively preconditions y = 1, y > 1 and y < 1 (these preconditions on y are showed in gray). For example, (y = 1) 9fT i g:pref i g(T i = 0) Thus the abstract network can be described by 15 integer variables (14 states of the abstract process and y). This system can be minimized by minimizing BFH90] the abstract graph of g. 2. This minimization is done by hidding all the labels involving only T i (which has been abstracted). We obtain the minimized abstract process of g. 3. Thus the abstract network can be described by only 6 integer variables (5 states of the abstract process and y). It is shown g. 4.
To prove mutual exclusion, we have to show that there is at most one process in state number 1, that is x 1 1. The tool Polka HMP95] computed automatically, by using convex polyhedra techniques, an inductive invariant implying this property.
The Fischer's protocol
Consider n processes like the one shown in g. 5, each with an associated timer c i . All of them have access to the shared integer variable lock. The time passing is modeled by a shared integer variable t which can be incremented. The ith process may attempt to enter its critical section only if lock = 0. Before two units of time, it has to lock it, by setting the variable lock to i. 5 . Thus, our abstract network will be described by 4 9 = 36 integer variables.
As before, this system can be minimized by minimizing the abstract state graph of one process. Each state of the graph of g. 5 is split into 9 states, We tried to use the tool Polka HMP95] to prove mutual exclusion. The computation has not been successful since it seems that any inductive invariant implying the mutual exclusion is not a convex polyhedron. The inductive invariant showed g. 7 has been computed by the tool IC Sa 97].
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an algorithm for the automatic construction of abstraction of parameterized networks. The method is based on the proof of rst order veri cation conditions. We have applied successfully our method to verify two example including a parameterized version of the Fischer's protocol.
Initial : x 0 := N; x 1 := 0; x 2 := 0; x 3 := 0; x 4 := 0; x 5 := 0;
x 6 := 0; x 7 := 0;
x 0 1 ?! x 1 := x 1 +x 2 +x 6 +x 7 ; x 2 := 0; x 5 := x 0 +x 5 ?1;
x 0 := 0; x 6 := 0; x 7 := 1;
x 2 1 ?! x 2 := x 2 ?1; x 3 := x 3 +1; x 3 1 ?! x 0 := x 0 +x 1 +x 2 +x 4 +x 5 +x 6 +x 7 +1; x 1 := 0; x 2 := 0; x 3 := x 3 ?1; x 4 := 0; x 5 := 0; x 6 := 0; x 7 := 0; x 4 1 ?! x 1 := x 1 +x 2 +x 6 +x 7 ; x 2 := 0; x 4 := x 4 ?1;
x 5 := x 0 +x 5 ; x 0 := 0; x 6 := 0; x 7 := 1;
x 5 1 ?! x 1 := x 1 +x 2 +x 6 +x 7 ; x 2 := 0; x 5 := x 0 +x 5 ?1;
x 0 := 0; x 6 := 0; x 7 := 1; true ?! x 1 := x 1 +x 4 ; x 2 := x 2 +x 6 ; x 4 := x 5 ; x 6 := x 7 ; x 7 := 0;
